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PREEMPTION  AS  INVERSE  NEGLIGENCE  PER  SE
Michael P. Moreland*
Federal preemption of state tort claims has been a controversial
and frequently litigated issue over the past decade, arguably constitut-
ing the most important, if confusing, development in tort law over
that period.  Books,1 law review symposia,2 and much of a blog3 are
devoted to the topic.  But a grand unified theory of preemption doc-
trine has been elusive, and preemption cases come to wildly unpre-
dictable results.  Sometimes statutory text is said to control the
outcome of a case, but sometimes statutory text is all but ignored.4
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educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Many
thanks to John Goldberg, Kevin Walsh, my colleagues in the Villanova summer works-
in-progress workshop, and workshop participants at Marquette University School of
Law for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Thanks also to Daniel
Halberstam, Christoph Mo¨llers, and other participants in a SIAS Summer Institute on
Comparative Federalism at the University of Michigan and to the James Madison
Program in the Department of Politics at Princeton University for a fellowship during
the 2010–11 academic year. Brittany Gigliotti (Villanova Law Class of 2012) and
Michael Melusky (Villanova Law Class of 2013) provided very able research assistance.
1 See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR (2008) (discussing the
federal agency preemption over state common law claims); PREEMPTION CHOICE 2
(William W. Buzbee, ed., 2009) (addressing preemption, including a focus of the
“antecedent political and regulatory choice of whether to preempt”).
2 See e.g., Symposium, Tort Law in the Shadow of Agency Preemption, 65 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 435 (2010); Symposium, Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal
Preemption Doctrine, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (2008); Symposium, Administrative Law’s
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power,  57 DUKE L.J.
1933 (2008).
3 See James M. Beck, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW BLOG (NOV. 11, 2012, 10:48 AM),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/.
4 As discussed below, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in Geier v. American
Honda, acknowledged that the statute had a saving clause that appeared to preserve
state common law claims but concluded that “the saving clause (like the express pre-
emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption princi-
ples.”  529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (emphasis removed).  In dissent, Justice Stevens
argued that “neither the text of the statute nor the text of the regulation contains any
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Sometimes questions of state sovereignty are placed at the forefront of
preemption analysis, but other times the demand for a uniform fed-
eral scheme of regulation trumps state common law.5  Sometimes
courts defer to an agency’s view about the preemptive effect of an
agency’s own regulations, but other times courts refuse to defer at all.6
It is little wonder that scholars have described the Supreme Court’s
preemption jurisprudence as a muddle or as simply a veiled assertion
of political power on behalf of either plaintiffs’ lawyers or defendant
manufacturers.7  How can we account for the apparently inconsistent
and unsatisfying results in preemption cases?
Part of the problem, I suggest, is that federal preemption of state
tort claims is particularly susceptible to the tendency to hit every legal
nail with a public law hammer.  What almost everyone in the preemp-
tion debate assumes is that the resolution of preemption cases is pri-
marily a question of public law, involving various aspects of
constitutional law, administrative law, and statutory interpretation.
My argument here is that this apparent consensus fails to account for
the divergent contexts to which preemption doctrine applies.  In par-
ticular, the preemption of common law tort claims raises specific tort
issues that have been largely neglected by courts and scholars.  Most
assume that common law tort remedies are state “regulations” in the
relevant sense and so are subject to review through considerations of
agency deference, regulatory competence, or national versus state
power.  This view obscures the fact that federal preemption, in
whatever context, is always an argument about preemption of some-
thing—a state law tort claim, a local government’s effort to engage in
indication of an intent to pre-empt” the state tort claim and that the Court had
engaged in an “unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory history and com-
mentary as a basis for implied pre-emption[.]” Id. at 912–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 Though there are cases involving financial regulation rather than preemption
of state tort claims, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519 (2009) and
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1 (2007) are notable examples of a disagree-
ment between interests of uniform federal regulation and state sovereignty in pre-
emption analysis.
6 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 521 (2008).
7 Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in Context, in
FEDERAL PREEMPTION 1, 2 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2007) (“[N]o
one is very happy with the Supreme Court’s muddled doctrine and meandering deci-
sions in this field.”); Sharkey, supra note 6, at 471 (“Given  the  contentious  territory
of preemption, frequently  summed  up  as  ‘a  muddle[.]’”).
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foreign affairs,8 state regulation of health insurers,9 or state labor
law.10
But once the question of whether federal law preempts state tort
law has been raised, it does not require—or so I shall argue—that
traditional principles of common law adjudication be discarded as
well, particularly where the only available substitutes for common law
categories are versions of textualist statutory interpretation or free-
wheeling “purposes and objectives” tests for implied preemption.11
This Article suggests that the missing element in much of the case law
and scholarship on preemption of tort claims is attention to the
underlying character of the common law tort claims themselves.  Such
attention has been neglected partly on account of the dominant con-
stitutional and administrative law approaches to preemption, but also
on account of the tendency even in tort law to treat products liability
as if it were a separate field with its own, quite different set of doc-
trines.  Though such issues are beyond the scope of this Article, the
shift in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability toward bring-
ing negligence considerations back into design defect claims,12 argu-
ments for the bearing of negligence factors on failure to warn
claims,13 and recent scholarship on such traditional tort topics as cau-
sation in products liability claims14 suggest that the effort to employ
8 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
9 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002).
10 See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 62 (2008).
11 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 161 (1999) (“It is very difficult to offer any general-
izations from this unruly mass of cases.  Although the presumption is set against pre-
emption, the strength of that presumption varies with the language of the particular
provision and nature of the overall Congressional program.  But there is no general
answer to the question: What did Congress intend?  So long as those intentions are
left unclear, litigation will veer this way and that.  Who said that ancient common law
principles lack the precision of modern statutes?”).
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998) (“A product is
defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect,
is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A
product: . . .  (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commer-
cial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the prod-
uct not reasonably safe[.]”).
13 See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990).
14 See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Non-Justicia-
ble Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 125, 130 (2010) (arguing
for “the elements of fault and causation be addressed together, rather than separately,
to provide a unified fault-cause metric for determining the extent of liability”).
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traditional common law tort doctrine in an area touching on products
liability is not as odd as it might at first appear. My suggestion in this
Article is that preemption analysis in the context of state tort claims
would benefit both descriptively and normatively, by invoking the
traditional tort doctrine of negligence per se but, in the preemption
context, on behalf of defendants— inverse negligence per se.
My argument will proceed in three steps.  First, I will summarize
the deep confusion around preemption doctrine, most recently on
display in a series of cases in the regulation of medical devices, auto-
mobile safety, and the labeling of prescription drugs.  Second, I will
take up the traditional doctrine of negligence per se and reframe pre-
emption of state tort law claims as “inverse negligence per se.”  Third
and finally, I will argue that preemption as inverse negligence per se
as applied to recent preemption case law offers a superior descriptive
account of the outcomes in recent cases and a superior normative
account for understanding federal preemption.
I. THE CONFUSION OF TRADITIONAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Scholars are frequently tempted to characterize any area they
happen to be working in as deeply confused or in need of thorough
reworking, but with respect to preemption such characterizations hap-
pen to be true.  The Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence
traces back to such cases as San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon,15 involving the National Labor Relations Act, and Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corporation,16 in which the Court held that an award of
punitive damages was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.17
Courts and scholars struggle to explain why preemption cases come to
divergent results, even in regulatory areas that are closely related.
State tort claims for design defects in medical devices that have
received pre-market approval from the FDA are preempted,18 but
claims that medical devices that were approved based on their similar-
ity to previously approved devices are not.19  Claims that automobiles
without airbags are defectively designed are preempted,20 but claims
that automobiles with lap-only seat belts (instead of lap and shoulder
belts) in rear inner seats are not.21  Design defect claims against man-
15 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
16 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
17 Id..
18 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008).
19 See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996).
20 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000).
21 See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139–40 (2011).
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ufacturers of routinely administered childhood vaccines22 and failure
to warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs are pre-
empted,23 but failure to warn claims for labeling of brand-name pre-
scription drugs are not.24  Commentators routinely characterize the
Supreme Court’s preemption case law as a “muddle,”25 turning on
narrowly technical discussions of statutory interpretation, agency def-
erence, and federalism.  But in recent years the pace of preemption
decisions has quickened considerably, particularly cases in which
defendants argue that federal law preempts state common law tort
claims.26
A. Overview of Preemption Doctrine
Preemption is the apparently straightforward constitutional doc-
trine based in the Supremacy Clause that a “state law that conflicts
with federal law is ‘without effect.’”27  Preemption is traditionally
divided among “express,” “conflict,” and “field” preemption:
Congress’ intent may be “explicitly stated in the statute’s language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”  In the
absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-
empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law
so thoroughly occupies a legislative field “‘as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it.’”28
Traditional preemption analysis begins with statutory interpreta-
tion.29  If the federal statute contains an express preemption clause,
then inconsistent state laws within the scope of the clause are pre-
22 See Bruesewitz. v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011).
23 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011).
24 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
25 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000).
26 See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 967, 969 n.9 (2002) (“A search by the author of preemption cases decided by the
Supreme Court since 1940 disclosed approximately 150 decided between 1940 and
1980 and an additional 150 in the twenty years between 1980 and 2000, roughly
double the amount of the previous forty years.”) This section is an updated survey of
tort preemption doctrine from Michael P. Moreland, Tort Reform by Regulation: FDA
Prescription Drug Labeling Rules and Preemption of State Tort Claims, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE
SCI. L. 39 (2007).
27 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
28 Id. (citations omitted)
29 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 25, at 227 (explaining preemption analysis). R
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empted.30  If there is no express preemption clause, courts typically
then consider whether state law is impliedly preempted, either
because Congress has occupied the relevant regulatory field or
because state law would pose an obstacle to federal objectives.31  Most
controversial is consideration of federal “purposes and objectives” in
preemption cases, where courts attempt to isolate congressional pur-
poses in enacting a statute and then try to determine whether state law
stands in the way of that purpose.32
Though the preemption debate had simmered for many years in
such contexts as federal nuclear safety statutes33 and cigarette warn-
ings,34 the most recent spate of controversy and litigation began in
January 2006 with the FDA’s release of a revision to its physician label-
ing rule for prescription drugs and an accompanying preamble assert-
ing that the rule preempted state common law causes of action. Some
states had already enacted statutes that provide measures of protec-
tion against liability for pharmaceutical defendants demonstrating
compliance with FDA requirements,35 and I will discuss below the dif-
ferences between such regulatory compliance arguments and my cate-
gory of “inverse negligence per se.”  Preemption at the federal level by
the FDA would, of course, have been a much more powerful defense
in pharmaceutical products liability litigation than relying on a patch-
work of state statutes. The FDA’s action, then, represented a newer,
more aggressive approach to federal preemption that some termed
“silent tort reform.”36
As the debate unfolded, five questions were at the heart of the
FDA preemption debate that are also pertinent to other regulatory
30 Among the cases discussed in this Article, Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312
(2008), provides the clearest example of express preemption.  Though outside the
scope of this Article’s subject, cases involving ERISA preemption provide a leading
example of express preemption analysis. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (holding that a state law claim was preempted because of the “sav-
ings clause, the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors defining the business of insurance,
and, most importantly, the clear expression of congressional intent that ERISA’s civil
enforcement scheme be exclusive”).
31 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)
32 Id. (citation omitted).
33 See e.g., id.; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
34 See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp.,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
35 See e.g. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-
05(3) (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-4 (2001);OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C)
(West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 82.007 (VERNON 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-203. (West 2002).
36 Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2006, at C5.
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settings. Part of my argument in defending an alternative approach to
preemption is that the interminable debates around these questions
frustrate progress in adequately understanding preemption. First,
where Congress has not expressly preempted state law (or where a
statute is ambiguous) how broadly may courts invoke principles of
conflict preemption to find state tort claims preempted?  Beginning
in 2000 with Geier v. American Honda Motor Company,37 the Supreme
Court has decided a series of preemption cases involving statutes that
did not expressly preempt state common law claims but in which the
Court has occasionally adopted a broader doctrine of implied conflict
preemption.  Because the FDA labeling cases based on failures to
warn and the automobile design defect cases discussed below did not,
almost everyone would agree, pose an example of express or implied
field preemption, the cases turned on obstacle conflict preemption
analysis.38
Second, are state tort claims “regulations” that pose a potential
conflict with federal regulations?  A recurring question in the preemp-
tion debate is whether permitting judges and juries to second-guess
federal administrative safety determinations undermines the federal
safety regime. Justice Blackmun’s partial concurrence and dissent in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group39 is the most forceful statement of the view—
now widely discarded—that tort law simply serves different purposes
than regulation and that defendant manufacturers should view com-
mon law judgments for damages simply as the “cost of doing busi-
ness”.40  That view stands in stark contrast to Justice Breyer’s claim in
Geier—now widely accepted—that common law liability poses effi-
37 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
38 But see Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug
Cases, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 463 (2009).
39 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
40  Id. at 536 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal
citations omitted):
The effect of tort law on a manufacturer’s behavior is necessarily indirect.
Although an award of damages by its very nature attaches additional conse-
quences to the manufacturer’s continued unlawful conduct, no particular
course of action (e.g., the adoption of a new warning label) is required. A
manufacturer found liable on, for example, a failure-to-warn claim may
respond in a number of ways. It may decide to accept damages awards as a
cost of doing business and not alter its behavior in any way. Or, by contrast,
it may choose to avoid future awards by dispensing warnings through a vari-
ety of alternative mechanisms, such as package inserts, public service adver-
tisements, or general educational programs. The level of choice that a
defendant retains in shaping its own behavior distinguishes the indirect reg-
ulatory effect of the common law from positive enactments such as statutes
and administrative regulations. Moreover, tort law has an entirely separate
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ciency and administrative obstacles that may thwart the federal safety
regime.41
Third, how should traditional considerations of federalism affect
the preemption debate?  Invocations of state sovereignty and defer-
ence to the traditional role of the states in such areas as tort law domi-
nate the preemption case law.  One side, as expressed by Erwin
Chemerinsky, argues that “[c]onservatives are hypocrites when it
comes to federalism,” because judicial and political conservatives favor
federalism in many contexts but not when it helps corporations evade
state tort liability.42  Others argue that preemption serves the goals of
a national market and that constitutional federalism is consistent with
a national regulatory approach.43  This disagreement over the role of
the states and the federal government is reflected in lobbying and
public relations efforts over preemption by, on one side, the business
lobby (such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers)44 and on the other, state and consumer-
interest groups (such as the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures).45  More generally, the preemption debate has often focused
narrowly on details of statutory interpretation and avoided structural
constitutional questions, leading Richard Epstein and Michael Greve
to argue in their introduction to a set of essays on preemption that
“[w]hat the preemption debate needs . . . is an examination that
reflects the delicate interplay between broad institutional considera-
function—compensating victims—that sets it apart from direct forms of
regulation.
Id. at 536–37.
41 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000).  An interesting
related issue but beyond the scope of my topic is whether tort plaintiffs have a right to
redress under common law that an expansive doctrine of federal preemption would
jeopardize. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 587–89 (2005).
42 Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33
PEPP. L. REV. 69, 69 (2005).
43 See Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2000); see also Richard A. Epstein, Why the
FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Rich-
ard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT LAW 1 (2006) (arguing the adoption of a contrary position
whereby the comprehensive nature of FDA regulation should be treated as occupying
the field).
44 Federal Preemption Cases, NAT’L CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., available at http://www.
chamberlitigation.com/cases/issue/federal-preemption (last visited Nov. 22 2012).
45 Preemption Monitor, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS., available at http://www.
ncsl.org/state-federal-committees.aspx?tabs=854,14,825 (last visited Nov. 22, 2012).
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tions and regulatory detail.”46  Or as Ernest Young observes in the
same volume, “[w]e need a Democracy and Distrust for federalism doc-
trine—that is, a doctrine of judicial review constructed to protect the
self-enforcing nature of the federalist system.”47
Fourth, should one’s view of the adequacy of the agency’s safety
oversight affect preemption analysis?  Justice Stevens’ opinions for the
Court in Medtronic v. Lohr48 and Wyeth v. Levine49 raised the issue of
whether the FDA and other agencies charged with overseeing safety
regimes are capable of effectively approving new products and moni-
toring their safety once brought to market.  Such a concern is based in
the view, however accurate, that “[t]he FDA is an underfunded agency
charged with regulating products that collectively constitute nearly
25% of the US gross domestic product.”50  If concerns about agency
effectiveness amid budget constraints continue, how, if at all, should
that shape courts’ willingness to find preemption of state common law
claims?
Fifth, are agency determinations with respect to preemption enti-
tled to administrative deference?  Arguably, the issue that most divides
the courts that have addressed preemption over the past several years
is whether agency conclusions about preemption—whether express or
implied—are entitled to administrative deference.  Justice Breyer’s
opinions for the Court in Geier and in Williamson v. Mazda clearly sig-
nal the Court’s willingness to treat the preemptive determinations of
agencies with deference in some contexts, perhaps even where the
agency has changed its position over time.  But the Court in Wyeth v.
Levine was unwilling to defer to the FDA and called into doubt the
objectivity of the agency’s conclusion that its labeling rule was pre-
emptive.  Preemption frequently turns on whether courts defer
toward agency views on preemption for the reasons articulated in
Geier or, instead, worry that political considerations have undermined
agency expertise and judgment, thereby rendering agency views
unworthy of deference as argued in Levine.
With those questions in mind, this section of the Article will sur-
vey three particular settings for preemption of state tort claims: medi-
46 Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in Context, in
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 1, 2 (Richard A. Epstein &
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
47 Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1395
(2001).
48 518 U.S. 511 (1995).
49 555 U.S. 555 (2008).
50 Bruce M. Psaty & R. Alta Charo, FDA Responds to Institute of Medicine Drug Safety
Recommendations—In Part, 297 JAMA 1917, 1917 (2007).
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cal devices, automobile safety, and the labeling of prescription drugs.
In each area, we will find two cases that come to opposing conclusions
about whether federal regulations preempt the state product liability
claim.  While many of the foregoing considerations are brought to
bear by the Court in deciding that the products liability claim is pre-
empted here but not there, such considerations are, I will argue in
Part II, under-determinative of the wildly unpredictable results that
the Court has reached.  Instead, consideration of the traditional tort
doctrine of negligence per se, albeit inversely (because employed here
by defendants), will help to make better sense of the Court’s patch-
work of preemption jurisprudence.
B. Medical Devices: Medtronic v. Lohr and Riegel v. Medtronic
In Medtronic v. Lohr, the Court faced a preemption claim based
on the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which regulate the “safety and effective-
ness of medical device intended for human use.”51  The plaintiff in
Lohr alleged that her pacemaker failed due to a product defect.52
Medtronic argued that the conflicting “requirement” provision of the
MDA preempted the state products liability claim:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or con-
tinue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2)
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter.53
The Court held that the Lohrs’ claims were not preempted by the
MDA.
[W]hen Congress enacted § 360k [of the MDA Justice Stevens wrote
for the majority], it was primarily concerned with the problem of
specific, conflicting state statutes and regulations rather than the
general duties enforced by common-law actions. . . .  In each
instance, the word is linked with language suggesting that its focus is
device-specific enactments of positive law by legislative or adminis-
trative bodies, not the application of general rules of common law
by judges and juries.54
51 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
52 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 480–81.
53 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1938).
54 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 489.
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More particularly, the Court argued that the MDA preempts state
law that imposes requirements, according to the statute, with respect
to medical devices.  “[T]he general state common-law requirements in
this suit were not,” according to the Court,
specifically developed “with respect to” medical devices. . . .  These
state requirements therefore escape pre-emption, not because the
source of the duty is a judge-made common-law rule, but rather
because their generality leaves them outside the category of require-
ments that [the MDA] envisioned to be “with respect to” specific
devices such as pacemakers.55
Additionally, in the background of Justice Stevens’ opinion for
the Court in Lohr was a public policy concern that the FDA’s approval
process for the pacemaker was not sufficiently protective of patient
safety.  Amid a detailed recitation of the FDA medical device approval
process, the Court drew a distinction between the “rigorous” pre-mar-
ket approval process that new devices undergo and the cursory review
accorded to devices that are “substantially equivalent” to preexisting
devices and are granted approval without needing to undergo the full
pre-market approval process.56  On account of the FDA’s limited abil-
ity to conduct full-scale pre-market review of many devices, “the
§ 510(k) premarket notification process became the means by which
most new medical devices . . . were approved for the market.”57
In a concurrence that provided a fifth vote for the judgment in
the case, Justice Breyer argued that the plurality opinion was wrong to
foreclose the possibility that the MDA could preempt a state tort
claim.  “One can,” Justice Breyer argued, “reasonably read the word
‘requirement’ as including the legal requirements that grow out of
the application, in particular circumstances, of a State’s tort law.”58  In
support, Justice Breyer relied on the Court’s (and Justice Stevens’s)
own words in  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., holding that “similar lan-
guage ‘easily’ encompassed tort actions because ‘[state] regulation
can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through
some form of preventative relief.’”59  Attacking the plurality’s asserted
distinction between a conflicting state regulation and a conflicting
state court judgment, Justice Breyer argued that “[t]o distinguish
between them for pre-emption purposes would grant greater
55 Id. at 501–02.
56 Id. at 476–79.
57 Id. at 479.
58 Id. at 504.
59 Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)) (altera-
tion in original).
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power . . . to a single state jury than to state officials acting through
state administrative or legislative lawmaking processes.”60
Justice Breyer agreed with the plurality, however, that the MDA’s
statutory language with respect to preemption of product defect
claims for medical devices that underwent the cursory premarket noti-
fication process was ambiguous and that, in turn, the Court should
look to the preemption determination of the relevant agency: “[I]n
the absence of a clear congressional command as to pre-emption,
courts may infer that the relevant administrative agency possesses a
degree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or other
administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect.”61  Because the
FDA itself had issued a narrowing preemption regulation in this con-
text, Justice Breyer concurred with the Court’s conclusion that the
plaintiff’s claim in Lohr was not preempted and that the FDA’s deter-
mination was entitled to deference.  But in a passage that would have
lasting effect for the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, Justice Breyer
noted that an agency can communicate preemptive intentions
“through statements in ‘regulations, preambles, interpretive state-
ments, and responses to comments,’ as well as through the exercise of
its explicitly designated power to exempt state requirements from pre-
emption.”62
In dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, argued that the MDA preempted
the common law claims.  Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Breyer
that common law claims “impose ‘requirements’ and are therefore
pre-empted where such requirements would differ from those
imposed by the FDCA.”63  Justice O’Connor would not, however, have
deferred to the FDA’s own views regarding preemption: “It is not cer-
tain that an agency regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of
any federal statute is entitled to deference . . . .  Where the language
of the statute is clear, resort to the agency’s interpretation is
improper.”64
In retrospect, Lohr stands for at least two propositions, one “pro-
preemption” and one “anti-preemption.”  Most squarely, of course,
the decision holds that the MDA does not preempt state common law
claims for defects in medical devices that undergo cursory premarket
notification.  But Justice Breyer’s concurrence signaled the potential
60 Id.
61 Id. at 505.
62 Id. at 506 (citation omitted) (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985)).
63 Id. at 509 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64 Id. at 512.
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for finding preemption in related contexts and provided the basis for
favoring preemption in later cases through his argument about the
effect of state tort claims on the federal safety regime.  The counter-
vailing policy considerations of FDA safety oversight (in Justice Ste-
vens’ opinion for the Court) and of concerns about judicial second-
guessing of agency safety determinations (in Justice Breyer’s concur-
rence) were clearly framed in Lohr.  Similarly, the dispute between
Justice Breyer’s concurrence and Justice O’Connor’s dissent with
respect to deference to agency preemption determinations arises in
subsequent preemption cases.
Twelve years later, in Riegel v. Medtronic,65 the Court held that the
preemption clause enacted in the MDA does bar common law claims
challenging the safety or effectiveness of a medical device that went
through the full premarket approval process before the FDA.66  Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Scalia began by giving a detailed explanation
of the regulatory regime that establishes various levels of oversight
from the FDA of the medical device approval process.  Class III
devices receive the most federal oversight, including the device at
issue in the case (a balloon catheter).  “Premarket approval is a ‘rigor-
ous’ process,” which includes hours of reviewing each application,
reporting requirements, and the authority to withdraw premarket
approval based on new information.67
The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Medtronic’s catheter was
defectively designed, labeled, and manufactured.  Since the MDA
expressly preempts only state requirements “different from, or in
addition to, any requirement applicable . . . to the device” under fed-
eral law, the Court had to determine, first, whether the federal gov-
ernment established requirements applicable to defendant’s catheter,
and, if so, whether the plaintiffs’ common law claims were based upon
New York requirements with respect to the device that were “different
from, or in addition to” the federal requirements.68
Relying on Lohr, the Court answered the first question in the
affirmative, noting that “[p]remarket approval . . . imposes ‘require-
ments’ under the MDA.”69  As to the second issue, the question was
“whether New York’s [common law] tort duties constituted ‘require-
ments’ under the MDA.”70  The Court adhered to the view in Lohr in
which “five Justices concluded that common-law causes of action for
65 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 317–18.
68 Id. at 316.
69 Id. at 322.
70 Id. at 323.
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negligence and strict liability do impose ‘requirement[s]’ and would
be pre-empted by federal requirements specific to a medical device.”71
In deciding that design defect claims about devices approved by
the FDA through the full pre-market approval process were pre-
empted, the Court rejected the view that “it is difficult to believe that
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse” for consumers injured by FDA-approved devices.72  Justice
Scalia noted that this is simply what a preemption clause does, and
“[i]t is not [the Court’s] job to speculate upon congressional
motives.”73  The Court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that “the duties
underlying negligence, strict-liability, and implied-warranty claims are
not pre-empted even if they impose ‘requirements’ because general
common law duties are not requirements maintained with respect to
devices.”74
Justice Stevens concurred and attempted to reconcile the Court’s
holding in Riegel with his own opinion for the Court in Lohr.  He
noted that the MDA’s text does, in fact, preempt state law require-
ments that differ and that “the language of the provision reaches
beyond such regulatory regimes to encompass other types of ‘require-
ments.’  Because common-law rules administered by judges, like stat-
utes and regulations, create and define legal obligations, some of
them unquestionably qualify as ‘requirements.’”75  Justice Ginsburg’s
lone dissent argued that Congress could not have “intend[ed]
§ 360k(a) to effect a radical curtailment of state common-law suits
seeking compensation for injuries caused by defectively designed or
labeled medical devices”76 and that statutes “containing a preemption
clause do not . . . escape the presumption against preemption.”77
C. Automobile Safety: Geier v. American Honda and
Williamson v. Mazda
It took only four years for Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Med-
tronic to become the basis for his opinion for the Court in Geier,78
arguably the most important products liability preemption decision of
the past 25 years, though its lasting effect on preemption jurispru-
71 Id. at 323–24.
72 Id. at 326.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 327 (internal quotation marks).
75 Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 334.
78 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
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dence has been called into question by Williamson and Levine.79  At
issue in Geier was whether a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) regarding airbags issued by the Department of Transporta-
tion would preempt a tort suit brought in the District of Columbia in
which the plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer should have
installed an airbag in her vehicle.80
Turning first to Honda’s argument that the underlying federal
statute in Geier (the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966) expressly preempted the plaintiff’s claims, the Court noted that
the statute contained a “saving” clause that preserved common law
claims.81  Specifically, the clause stated that compliance with a federal
safety standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law.”82  But the Court quickly moved to analyze conflict pre-
emption and noted that “the saving clause . . . does not bar the ordi-
nary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”83
Justice Breyer argued that permitting state courts to entertain
common law claims would necessarily interfere with achieving federal
objectives.  According to Justice Breyer, such an approach would
“avoid the conflict, uncertainty, cost, and occasional risk to safety itself
that too many different safety-standard cooks might otherwise cre-
ate.”84  Conflict preemption is applicable in such cases, the Court con-
tended, because “the rules of law that judges and juries create or apply
in such [state common law] suits may themselves similarly create
uncertainty and even conflict, say, when different juries in different
States reach different decisions on similar facts.”85  Adopting a view of
common law claims that sharply contrasts with the view of Justice
Blackmun in Cipollone, the Court in Geier asserted that “[i]nsofar as
[plaintiffs’] argument would permit common-law actions that ‘actually
conflict’ with federal regulations, it would take from those who would
enforce a federal law the very ability to achieve the law’s congressio-
79 See Davis, supra note 26, at 1012 (“Geier represents a seismic shift in the Court’s
preemption doctrine.”).
80 Geier, 529 U.S. at 864–65.
81 Id. at 867–68.
82 Id. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
83 Id. at 869; see also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995) (“The
fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’— i.e.,
supports a reasonable inference—that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other
matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of
implied pre-emption.”).
84 Geier, 529 U.S. at 871.
85 Id.
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nally mandated objectives that the Constitution, through the opera-
tion of ordinary preemption principles, seeks to protect.”86
On the issue of deference to an agency’s own determination with
respect to the preemptive effect of federal statutory or regulatory
requirements, the Court accorded significant weight to the Depart-
ment of Transportation’s interpretation of the FMVSS as expressed by
the views of the Solicitor General in Geier.  As summarized by the
Court:
The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own
regulation and its objectives and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to compre-
hend the likely impact of state requirements.  And DOT has
explained [the FMVSS’s] objectives, and the interference that ‘no
airbag’ suits pose thereto, consistently over time.  In these circum-
stances, the agency’s own views should make a difference.87
In taking such a forceful position on deference to an agency’s
views about preemption, the Court did not address whether it was
employing the same deferential standard the Court applies in other
administrative law settings pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,88 and later cases have been erratic in
their discussion of agency deference.89
Joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens
dissented in Geier.90  Agreeing with the Court that the federal statute
did not expressly preempt the state common law claims, Justice Ste-
vens proceeded to argue that neither did the federal statute impliedly
preempt the claims under principles of conflict preemption.91  With
respect to the central issue in the conflict preemption analysis—
whether the state requirement would frustrate or undermine the fed-
eral safety interest—Justice Stevens argued that the safety standard
imposed “minimum, rather than fixed or maximum, requirements.”92
Exposure to tort liability would, in fact, help achieve the federal safety
goal, according to Justice Stevens: “The possibility that exposure to
potential tort liability might accelerate the rate of increase [of airbag
installation] would actually further the only goal explicitly mentioned
86 Id. at 872.
87 Id. at 883 (citations omitted).
88 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
89 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004)
(arguing that Chevron deference should not apply to agency interpretation of preemp-
tive effect of statutes).
90 Geier, 529 U.S. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 899.
92 Id.at 903.
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in the standard itself: reducing the number of deaths and severity of
injuries of vehicle occupants.”93
Finally, Justice Stevens raised a public policy argument grounded
in federalism and the presumption against preemption, particularly
“when the pre-emptive effect of an administrative regulation is at
issue:”94
The signal virtues of this presumption are its placement of the
power of pre-emption squarely in the hands of Congress, which is
far more suited than the Judiciary to strike the appropriate state/
federal balance (particularly in areas of traditional state regulation),
and its requirement that Congress speak clearly when exercising
that power.  In this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the
normal operation of the legislative process operate to defend state
interests from undue infringement.95
This so-called presumption against preemption dates to the
Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation96
(a field preemption case) in which the Court stated that “in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied . . . [the Court] start[s]
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”97  Following Geier, many commenta-
tors have followed Justice Stevens’s lead and claimed that the Court
has eliminated the presumption against preemption.98  In defense of
the Court’s disregard of the presumption against preemption in Geier,
93 Id. at 903–04.
94 Id. at 908.
95 Id. at 907; see also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 44 (2007) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that [the Tenth] Amendment was included in the
Bill of Rights should nevertheless remind the Court that its ruling affects the alloca-
tion of powers among sovereigns.  Indeed, the reasons for adopting that Amendment
are precisely those that undergird the well-established presumption against pre-
emption.”).
96 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
97 Id. at 230.
98 See e.g., Calvin Massey, “Joltin’ Joe Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Pre-
sumption Against Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 759 (2003); Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study
in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Pre-
sumption Against Preemption?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2002). But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 62 (2007) (“The rumors of the death of the Rice presumption against pre-
emption may be exaggerated.  Against Geier, one can set three more recent decisions
that refused to preempt state law, one of which recited Rice’s clear statement rule as a
justification for its holding.  If the Court were so inclined, there is little doubt that the
ambiguity in its preemption precedents would leave it ample room to convert Rice
into a more powerful default rule disfavoring preemption by ambiguous federal
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however, one could argue that the presumption is primarily a rule of
statutory interpretation in express preemption cases (and so was rightly
prominent in Lohr) but has generally and rightly not been invoked by
the Court in conflict preemption cases, though, the invocation of the
presumption against preemption (as with principles of agency defer-
ence) has been erratic and unhelpful to resolving preemption cases.
In Geier, the fault lines on preemption were sharply drawn, even if
shifting and unstable majorities on the Court have come to different
holdings in later cases.  Justice Stevens’s insistence on a broad pre-
sumption against preemption and reluctance to find preemption
based solely on administrative determinations has found expression in
several subsequent cases.99  But Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for
the Court signals all of the major themes of the argument on behalf of
federal preemption:
The conflict between state common law claims and the aims of fed-
eral uniform safety regulation,
Deference to an administrative agency’s own determinations about
the preemptive effect of its statutes or regulations, and
The potentially expansive scope of implied conflict preemption
even where express preemption is not available as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation.
In Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.,100 the Court con-
fronted a case that, on its face, seemed to pose the same issues as
Geier.  Just as the automobile manufacturers in Geier had a choice
under the federal regulatory regime among different types of passive
safety restraints, so also Mazda argued that the choice between lap-
and-shoulder belts or only lap belts preempted a jury from second-
guessing the manufacturer’s decision.101  But the Court—indeed, Jus-
tice Breyer, the same member of the Court who had written for the
Court in Geier—held that the state tort suit was not preempted.102
The key distinction between Geier and Williamson is the different
answers given to the question of whether the manufacturer’s choice
among safety measures is a “significant objective of the federal regula-
tion.”103  In drawing this distinction, the Court looks to the regulation
itself, its history, and the agency’s views about the regulation’s objec-
laws.”) (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002)).
99 See, e.g., Watters, 550 U.S. at 22–44  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
101 Id. at 1140.
102 Id. at 1134.
103 Id.
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tives and its preemptive effect.  The Court held that the 1989 version
of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208) does not
preempt state tort suits claiming that manufacturers should have
installed lap-and-shoulder belts, instead of lap belts, on rear inner
seats because providing manufacturers with this seatbelt choice is not
a “significant objective” of the federal regulation.104
As explained by Justice Breyer in Williamson, in Geier the Court
held that the 1984 version of FMVSS 208 preempted a state law tort
suit that would have deprived the manufacturers of the choice, given
to them by the federal regulations, to choose a mix of several different
passive restraint systems because such a choice was a significant objec-
tive of the federal regulation.105  The history of the 1984 regulation,
the agency’s contemporaneous explanation, and the federal govern-
ment’s current understanding of the regulation convinced the Court
that manufacturer choice was an important regulatory objective.  (For
instance, in Geier, the Department of Transportation hoped that a mix
of passive restraint systems would lead to better information about the
devices’ comparative effectiveness and to the eventual development of
“alternative, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems.”106)
Justice Breyer explained that, in Geier, the Court divided the pre-
emption question into “three subsidiary questions”: (1) “[W]hether
the statute’s express pre-emption provision preempted the state tort
suit;” (2) whether the saving clause “foreclose[d] or limit[ed] ‘the
operation of ordinary pre-emption principles insofar as those princi-
ples instruct us to read’ federal statutes as pre-empting state laws . . .
that ‘actually conflict’ with the federal statutes;” and (3) “whether . . .
the state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation.”107  In Wil-
liamson, the Court again looked to those three questions and noted
that “[i]n light of Geier, the statute’s express pre-emption clause can-
not pre-empt the common-law tort action; but neither can the stat-
ute’s saving clause foreclose or limit the operation of ordinary conflict
pre-emption principles.”108  As a result, the Court turned its attention
once again to Geier’s third subsidiary question.
Although the history of the regulation of seat belts for rear inner
seats was somewhat similar to the history of the regulation of airbags,
there were some crucial differences.  Unlike with airbags,
104 Id. at 1137.
105 Id.
106 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 879 (2000).
107 Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1135–36 (citing Geier, ibid).
108 Id. at 1136.
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DOT here was not concerned about consumer acceptance; it was
convinced that lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety; it did
not fear additional safety risks arising from use of those belts; it had
no interest in assuring a mix of devices; and, though it was con-
cerned about additional costs, that concern was diminishing.109
There was evidence that the reason the federal agency did not
require lap-and-shoulder belts in these seats was because of possible
entry and exit problems on account of stretching the shoulder belt
across the aisle, but it encouraged manufacturers to address this issue
through innovation.110  Also, the agency did not require lap-and-
shoulder belts because it did not think the requirement would be cost-
effective, though costs would presumably not remain frozen.111  Thus,
although the state tort suit may restrict the manufacturer’s choice, it
does not “‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment . . . of the full
purposes and objectives’ of federal law,” and the regulation does not
preempt the tort action in Williamson.112
Writing in concurrence, Justice Sotomayor—now the leading
opponent of federal preemption on the Court following Justice Ste-
vens’s retirement—agreed with the majority and wrote separately only
to emphasize the Court’s rejection of an overreading of Geier that had
developed in the lower courts and that:
Geier does not stand . . . for the proposition that any time an agency
gives manufacturers a choice between two or more options, a tort
suit that imposes liability on the basis of one of the options is an
obstacle to the achievement of a federal regulatory objective and
may be pre-empted.113
D. Prescription Drug Labeling: Wyeth v. Levine
and PLIVA v. Mensing
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court held that claims against the manu-
facturer of an antihistamine (used to treat nausea) for failing to ade-
quately warn of the dangers of administering the drug intravenously
using an IV-push (rather than IV-drip) were not preempted.114 The
109 Id. at 1138.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1139.
112 Id. at 1140 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
113 Id. at 1140 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  Justice Thomas
also concurred on the grounds that the Safety Act’s saving clause speaks directly to
the question: “Read independently of the express pre-emption clause, the saving
clause simply means what it says: FMVSS 208 does not preempt state common law
actions.” Id. at 1141–42 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114 555 U.S. 555, 555 (2009).
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Court rejected the defendant’s arguments that (1) the manufacturer
could not have modified the warning label placed on the drug once it
had been approved by the FDA and that it was impossible for the man-
ufacturer to comply with both state law duties underlying failure-to-
warn claims and its federal labeling duties, or (2) requiring the manu-
facturer to comply with a state law duty to provide stronger warning
about IV-push administration—after the FDA had previously
approved the warning label placed on the drug—would obstruct the
purposes and objectives of the federal prescription drug labeling
regulation.115
The issue in Levine was whether FDA approval of Wyeth’s labeling
of the drug Phenergan provided Wyeth with a complete defense to
plaintiff’s tort claim.116  In answering whether federal law preempted
the plaintiff’s claim that Phenergan’s label did not contain an ade-
quate warning about using the IV-push method of administration, the
Court noted two guides to its reasoning: First, “the purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case,”117 and,
second:
[I]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Con-
gress has “legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied” . . . we “start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”118
Wyeth’s arguments were based on conflict preemption.  Wyeth
first argued that Levine’s state law claims were preempted, because it
would be impossible for Wyeth to comply both with the state law
duties underlying those claims and with its federal labeling duties
under the FDCA.119  While, generally speaking, a manufacturer may
only change a drug label after the FDA approves a supplemental appli-
cation, if a manufacturer is changing a label to “add or strengthen an
instruction about dosage and administration that is intended to
increase the safe use of the drug product,” it may make the labeling
change upon filing its supplemental application to the FDA and need
not wait for FDA approval—the so-called “‘changes being effected’
(CBE) regulation.”120  Wyeth’s argument was that a manufacturer may
only change its label “to reflect newly acquired information,”121 but
115 Id. at 564–65.
116 Id. at 555.
117 Id. at 565 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
118 Id. (citations omitted).
119 Id. at 560–61.
120 Id. at 568 (citation omitted).
121 Id. (citation omitted).
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the Court held that this misunderstood the federal regulatory
scheme.122  Strengthening the drug’s warning in this case would not
cause Wyeth to run afoul of the federal law governing unauthorized
distribution and misbranding—in fact, the CBE regulation permitted
it.123  Thus, Wyeth’s impossibility preemption defense failed.124
Wyeth’s second argument was that requiring it to comply with a
state law duty to provide a stronger warning about IV-push administra-
tion would conflict with the purposes and objectives of federal drug
labeling regulation.125  Wyeth asserted that the plaintiff’s product lia-
bility claims should be preempted because they interfered with “Con-
gress’s purpose to entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling
decisions that strike a balance between competing objectives.”126  The
Court rejected this argument and noted that the FDA cast federal
labeling standards as a floor upon which states could build, not a ceil-
ing.127  Likewise, the FDA had long maintained that state law offers an
additional and important layer of consumer protection that comple-
ments FDA regulation.128  Most importantly, Wyeth’s argument mis-
construed the intent of Congress behind the FDCA, because Congress
did not intend the FDCA to preempt state law failure-to-warn
claims.129
Justice Thomas wrote separately to register his disagreement with
the majority’s employment of implied preemption analysis and the
use of “purposes and objectives” preemption tests.130  Justice Thomas
argued, “the Court routinely invalidates state laws based on perceived
conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or
generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied
within the text of federal law.”131  Justice Thomas signaled his view
that the Court’s entire body of “purposes and objectives” jurispru-
dence relating to Wyeth’s second argument is inherently flawed
because the cases “improperly rely on legislative history, broad atex-
tual notions of congressional purpose, and even congressional inac-
tion in order to pre-empt state law.”132  He argued that such an
122 Id. at 569.
123 Id. at 570.
124 Id. at 573.
125 Id.
126 Id. (citation omitted).
127 Id. at 577–78
128 Id. at 578.
129 Id. at 574–75.
130 Id. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 594.
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approach to implied preemption encourages an overly expansive
reading of statutory text and requires inquiry into matters beyond the
scope of judicial review:
[T]his . . . Court’s [purposes and objectives] pre-emption jurispru-
dence facilitates freewheeling, extra-textual, and broad evaluations
of the “purposes and objectives” embodied within federal law.  This,
in turn, leads to decisions giving improperly broad pre-emptive
effect to judicially manufactured policies, rather than to the statu-
tory text enacted by Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the
agency actions authorized thereby.  Because such a sweeping
approach to pre-emption leads to the illegitimate—and thus,
unconstitutional—invalidation of state laws, I can no longer assent
to a doctrine that pre-empts state laws merely because they “stan[d]
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives” of federal law as perceived by this Court.133
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Wyeth v. Levine summarizes the
depth of the confusion surrounding the Supreme Court’s preemption
jurisprudence, particularly in cases of implied preemption. Levine was
the culmination of several years of litigation and administrative
rulemaking over whether the FDA’s physician-label approval process
for prescription drugs preempted state failure to warn claims.134  In
agreeing with the majority in Levine that implied preemption did not
apply to the plaintiff’s claims, Justice Thomas broke with the other
conservatives on the Court in agreeing that plaintiff’s claims were not
preempted, but he took the occasion to voice his frustration with the
Court’s overall approach to implied preemption cases. A freewheeling
“purposes and objectives” analysis has led, he argued, to an unpredict-
able and unprincipled set of decisions in implied preemption cases.135
This problem is compounded by use of the “presumption against pre-
emption” in express preemption cases.136  Justice Thomas’s proposed
solution to this confusion was to do away with any narrowing construc-
tion of express preemption clauses (thus no longer any “presumption
against preemption”), but also for the Court to get out of the business
of finding implied preemption where the statute is silent.137  Such a
textualist approach, Justice Thomas argues, is required by constitu-
tional structural considerations such as bicameralism, presentment,
and federalism.138
133 Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
134 Id. at 561–63 (majority opinion).
135 See id. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
136 See id. at 624 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137 See id. at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
138 Id. at 585–87.
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It is hard to argue with Justice Thomas’s view that the Court’s
preemption jurisprudence is unpredictable and confused, particularly
for an area of law that confronts the Court so frequently.  The hope
that throwing preemption cases into the morass of administrative law
levels of agency deference has proven especially unpromising.  But it
is not clear that Justice Thomas’s textualist solution will appreciably
resolve the problems of preemption jurisprudence.  Even if more
members of the Court were inclined to agree that express preemption
cases should not adopt a presumption against preemption, Justice
Thomas’s outright rejection of implied preemption flies in the face of
overwhelming precedent for the view that state tort claims can, in
some cases, frustrate the aims of federal safety regulation.  But, as
Catherine Sharkey has recently noted, Justice Thomas, in this respect,
offers perhaps the only principled and consistent approach to pre-
emption cases—rejecting any “presumption against preemption” in
express preemption cases and refusing even to recognize a doctrine of
implied preemption.139
In dissent, Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Scalia) lamented that with the decision in Levine, “a state tort jury,
rather than the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is ultimately
responsible for regulating warning labels for prescription drugs.”140
Justice Alito noted that juries are ill-equipped to perform the FDA’s
cost-benefit-balancing function,141 and he argued that the holding in
Levine cannot be reconciled with Geier142 or with the general princi-
ples of conflict preemption.143  According to the dissent, in order to
evade Geier’s application to the case, the Court compounded both fac-
tual and legal errors.144  For example, Justice Alito asserted that the
Court’s comment that the 2000 Phenergan label “did not contain a
specific warning about the risks of IV-push administration” was
untrue, and the physician’s assistant who treated the plaintiff disre-
garded at least six separate warnings on Phenergan’s labeling.145
The Court’s rejection of preemption in Wyeth v. Levine seemed to
spell the end of defendant manufacturers’ argument for FDA preemp-
tion of failure to warn claims in labeling cases, particularly when Jus-
tice Thomas joined with the more liberal members of the Court in
139 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is
Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 63 (2010).
140 Levine, 555 U.S. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 626.
142 See id. at 612, 621.
143 See id. at 609–10.
144 Id. at 612.
145 Id. at 605, 619.
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opposing FDA preemption.  This conventional wisdom was short-lived,
though, for Justice Thomas himself commanded a majority of the
Court in upholding a preemption defense just two years later in
another prescription drug labeling case, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing.146
The drug in Mensing, metoclopramide, aids in treating digestive
ailments.147  FDA approved the drug under the brand-name Reglan in
1980, and, five years later, generic manufacturers began to produce
the drug.  Evidence has shown that it can cause tardive dyskinesia, a
severe neurological disorder.148  Warning labels on metoclopramide
have gradually been strengthened over the years, with the most recent
warning stating expressly that treatment can cause tardive dyskine-
sia.149  Two separate plaintiffs, Gladys Mensing (Minnesota) and Julie
Demahy (Louisiana), were prescribed the generic drug in 2001 and
2002 and developed tardive dyskinesia after taking it for several
years.150
Mensing and Demahy brought separate claims in which they sued
the generic manufacturers, alleging that the drug caused their condi-
tions and that the manufacturers were liable under Minnesota and
Louisiana law for failing to provide adequate labels in light of evi-
dence showing the risk was greater than the label indicated.151  The
manufacturers argued the claims were preempted by the federal stat-
ute and FDA regulations requiring them to use the same labels as
their brand-name counterparts and making it impossible to comply
with both state and federal law.152
Justice Thomas began by comparing state and federal law.  He
noted that Minnesota and Louisiana law require a manufacturer that
is, or should be, aware of a product’s danger to label it in a way that
renders it reasonably safe.153  In Minnesota, there is a duty to warn if
the manufacturer has actual or constructive knowledge of a danger.154
In Louisiana, there is also a duty to provide adequate instructions for
the product’s safe use.155  Federal law, Justice Thomas noted, imposes
far more complex drug labeling requirements.156  Under the FDCA, a
146 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
147 Id. at 2572.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 2573.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 2570.
154 Id. at 2573.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2574.
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manufacturer seeking federal approval to market a new drug has to
prove the drug’s safety and effectiveness and to show that the label is
accurate and adequate.157  Justice Thomas noted that while this for-
merly applied to all drugs, Congress passed the Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act (the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments)158 in 1984 to facilitate the manufacture of generic
drugs by allowing generic drugs to gain FDA approval by showing
equivalence to an FDA-approved brand-name drug.159  The generic
manufacturer also has to show that the label used on the generic drug
is the same as the brand-name drug’s approved label.160
As a result of Hatch-Waxman, brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers have different federal drug labeling duties: the brand-
name manufacturer is responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of
the label, while the generic manufacturer is responsible for making its
label the same as the brand-name drug’s label.161  Justice Thomas
pointed out that the parties agreed on this but disagreed over whether
generic manufacturers may change their labels after initial FDA
approval.  The plaintiffs argued that federal law provided avenues
through which the defendants could have altered the labels,162 but
the FDA interpreted its regulations to require identical labels.163  The
Court noted that the FDA’s views were controlling unless they were
“‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ or there
[was] any other reason to doubt they reflect[ed] the FDA’s fair and
considered judgment.”164
The Court then considered the avenues that the plaintiffs
claimed the defendants could have used to strengthen the warning
label.  First and as in Levine, the plaintiffs claimed that the FDA’s
“changes-being-effected” (CBE) process allowed the defendants to
change the labels when necessary, because it allowed manufacturers
to add or strengthen a warning or instruction without waiting for FDA
approval.165  The FDA said, however, that the generic drug manufac-
turer defendants could not have used the CBE process unilaterally to
strengthen the labels, because the CBE process was intended to allow
157 Id.
158 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.
§§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)).
159 PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 2574–75.
164 Id. at 2575 (internal citation omitted).
165 Id.
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changes only when generic labels were being changed to match
updated brand-name labels or to follow FDA instructions.166  Because
the FDA’s interpretation was not plainly erroneous, the Court
deferred to it.167
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants could have used
“Dear Doctor” letters to send warnings to prescribing physicians and
healthcare professionals.168  The FDA rejected this as well, because
the letters would qualify as labeling and so would be required to be
consistent with the drug’s approved labeling.169  A letter with new
warnings would be inconsistent with the brand-name labels.170
Third, the FDA suggested that the defendants were required
themselves to propose stronger warning labels if they thought they
were necessary.171  If the FDA agreed with the need for a stronger
warning, it would have worked to create a new label for both the
brand-name drug and the generic equivalent.  The manufacturers
argued that this was not required of them, but the Court noted that
this issue did not need to be resolved to decide the case and it could
be assumed that such a requirement did exist.172
In the Court’s view, all of this meant that where state and federal
law conflict, and it is impossible for a private party to comply with
both, state law gives way to federal law.173  If the defendants had
changed their labels independently, they would have complied with
state law but violated federal law.  The federal duty to request FDA
assistance does not change anything—that would satisfy the federal
duty but not the state duty to provide adequate labeling, because state
law demanded a safer label, not communication with FDA about the
possibility of a safer label.  Thus, it was impossible for the defendants to
comply with the state duty to change the label and the federal duty to
keep the same label as the brand-name drug.174
The Court argued that the holding in Mensing was consistent with
the Court’s holding in Levine because the defendant in Levine could
(unlike the defendants in Mensing) have acted unilaterally to change
the label through the CBE process.175  But there is no getting around
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2576.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 2577.
173 Id. at 2577–78.
174 Id. at 2578.
175 Id. at 2580–82.
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the odd implication that if the plaintiffs in Mensing had been given a
brand-name drug then their claims would not have been preempted.
The Court’s best explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that
the FDA’s own view is that new information about drugs in long use
(such as generic drugs) appears infrequently, because patent protec-
tions prevent generic drugs from arriving on the market for several
years after the brand-name drug.  In the end, the Court simply
asserted that it is not the Court’s job to decide whether the statutory
scheme established by Congress is unusual, and Congress and the
FDA can always change the statute or the accompanying
regulations.176
Part of Justice Thomas’s opinion only had the support of a four
Justice plurality of the Court.  In this portion, Justice Thomas argued
that the Supremacy Clause is a non obstante provision used to specify
the degree to which new statutes are intended to repeal older statutes,
and the Supremacy Clause suggests that federal law should be under-
stood as impliedly repealing conflicting state laws.177  Justice Thomas
argued that the Clause also indicated that courts should not strain to
find ways to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state
law.178  Further, he argued that considering the contingencies inher-
ent in preemption analysis of these types of cases would be inconsis-
tent with the non obstante provision of the Supremacy Clause, because
it would force manufacturers to continually prove that the FDA and
brand-name manufacturer would not change the label in order to
establish the supremacy of federal law, and the Supremacy Clause
does not contemplate this sort of “contingent supremacy.”179
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) explained that generic drugs have
become very popular and make up approximately 75 percent of pre-
scription drugs on the market, which are the fruits of legislative efforts
to expand production and consumption of generic drugs, so much so
that when generic versions of a drug enter the market the brand-name
manufacturer often stops selling the drug.180  She noted that the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments were designed to make more low-cost
generic drugs available by establishing generic drug approval proce-
dures that involved an abbreviated application process and that all
states have legislation allowing pharmacists to substitute generic drugs
176 Id. at 2582.
177 Id. at 2579–80.
178 Id. at 2580.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 29  8-MAR-13 16:13
2013] preemption  as  inverse  negligence  per  se 1277
for brand-name drugs.181  Harkening to the presumption against pre-
emption, Justice Sotomayor argued that, while Congress enacted an
express preemption provision for medical devices in 1976, it did not
include an express preemption provision in the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments eight years later, and this is evidence that Congress did
not intend for FDA oversight to be the only way to ensure drug safety
and effectiveness.182
According to the dissent, while the defendants and the majority
both relied on the fact that the defendants could not change their
labels unilaterally to distinguish the case from Levine, the defendants
in Levine could have used the CBE process unilaterally but would still
have had to wait for FDA approval of the change.183  Thus, compli-
ance with state and federal law in Levine required the action of both
the defendants and the FDA.  The Levine Court required the defend-
ants to show that the FDA would not have approved the changes in
order to show impossibility.184  The same approach, argued Justice
Sotomayor, should have applied to Mensing.185  The defendants had a
means of complying with the state duty to warn.  If the FDA rejected a
proposal, did not respond to a proposal, or had considered and
rejected the same change earlier, manufacturers could show impossi-
bility, but those considerations were not present in Mensing.
Finally, Justice Sotomayor also criticized the plurality’s view of the
Supremacy Clause.  She noted that it adopted a novel interpretation
of the Supremacy Clause as a non obstante provision, indicating that
courts should not apply a presumption against implied repeals.186
But, in her view, the Court’s precedents run to the contrary and pre-
sume that congressional action does not supersede the historic police
powers of the states unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.187
181 Id. at 2583.
182 Id. at 2586–87.
183 Id. at 2582–83.
184 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).
185 PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
186 Id. at 2590–91.
187 Id. The Supreme Court will revisit PLIVA v. Mensing and preemption of state
law design-defect claims against generic drugs during October Term 2012. See Bartlett
v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694
(U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-142).
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II. PREEMPTION AND INVERSE NEGLIGENCE PER SE
A. The Private Law Foundations of Inverse Negligence Per Se
In The Idea of Private Law, Ernest Weinrib notes the dominant ten-
dency of functionalist accounts of law to understand law merely in
terms of its purposes.  As Weinrib explains, “[t]he functionalist is con-
cerned with whether the results of cases promote the postulated goals.
Private law, however, is more than the sum of its results.  It also
includes a set of concepts, a distinctive institutional setting, and a
characteristic mode of reasoning.”188  So pervasive are such function-
alist accounts that in the law of torts we have a difficult time thinking
in alternative terms.  Negligence in tort law, for example, comes to be
understood simply as incentivizing would-be defendants to take the
optimal level of precaution, and strict liability is applicable to cases in
which there is no optimal level of a defendant’s reasonable care (in
cases of ultrahazardous activities) or where the defendant is in the
best position to spread the costs of the plaintiff’s injury.189
This functionalist approach to tort law is a product of various
jurisprudential forces from the late-nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries.  As John Goldberg has traced out, the moral skepticism of Oliver
Wendell Holmes led torts scholars of succeeding generations to
ascribe to tort law a minimalist, compensation and deterrence-based
justification, for any richer conception of tort law’s aims was thought
to be too uncertain and too contested to account for tort law’s fea-
tures.190  The leading mid-twentieth century treatise on torts by Wil-
liam Prosser, for example, discussed tort law in precisely such
compensation and deterrence categories.191  And when Prosser’s com-
pensation and deterrence view was supplemented by law and econom-
ics analysis, torts scholarship substituted one functionalist account for
another.
Against this tide of functionalist views, a recent body of work in
tort theory has sought to recover the distinctly private law aspects of
188 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 4–5 (1995).
189 Id. at 36–37.
190 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 520–21
(2002); John C. P. Goldberg, Style and Skepticism in The Path of the Law, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 225, 273–75 (1997); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1752–56 (1998) (discussing Holmes’s
“assault on duty” and its current place in negligence theory, rooted in his positivism
and leanings toward classical liberalism).  For a comprehensive and mostly sympa-
thetic view of Holmes’s effect on the evolution of tort law, see DAVID ROSENBERG, THE
HIDDEN HOLMES (1995).
191 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
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tort law.  In addition to Weinrib’s broadly Kantian account in The Idea
of Private Law, so also the civil recourse or “torts as wrongs” view devel-
oped by John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky192 and the corrective
justice view advanced by Jules Coleman seek—albeit in quite different
ways—to question the dominance of functionalist account of tort
law.193  But as Goldberg and Zipursky point out, much work remains
to be done by those arguing for a private law account of torts if it is to
be vindicated.194  This is not merely a normative task—that is, arguing
for the view that tort law should be conceived in private law terms—but
also a descriptive task, for much of tort law appears to be based on
deterrence-based reasons, or incentive-balancing, and the like.195  I
have chosen an unlikely topic to help make this descriptive and nor-
mative case for the private law aspects of torts: federal preemption of
state products liability claims.
Preemption as inverse negligence per se seeks to recover an over-
looked but obvious feature of preemption cases, namely that they
arise as private law tort claims in which an allegedly injured plaintiff is
suing a particular defendant.  Preemption is an argument by the defen-
dant that a federal statute (expressly or impliedly) prevents the plain-
tiff’s claim from going forward.  Much of the preemption debate
proceeds as if this were a jurisdictional argument of a kind, that is, as if
the federal statute or regulation removed a court’s jurisdiction to
adjudicate the plaintiff’s common law tort claim (except for the juris-
diction to hold that the claim has been preempted). A better account
would instead emphasize the conflicts of law aspects of preemption
and the relation between the choice of federal or state law in torts
cases.
The preemption-as-jurisdictional view has been called into doubt
by Caleb Nelson’s important historical work on preemption, even if
one does not follow Justice Thomas and the plurality in Mensing in
adopting some of the implications of Nelson’s historical argument.  As
192 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 920 (2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998).
193 JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 3–63 (2001); JULES COLEMAN,
RISKS AND WRONGS 303–28 (1992).
194 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 192, at 978. R
195 But as Weinrib and others have pointed out, law and economics run into
problems with, for example, including causation among the elements of negligence.
See WEINRIB, supra note 188, at 47–48 (“[E]conomic analysis operates independently R
of the doctrines, concepts, and institutions that characterize private law.  While econ-
omists applaud legal results that coincide with efficiency, their framework does not
respect the law’s characteristic features on their own terms.  The economists ‘dispense
with’ or regard as ‘alien’ even so central a feature as causation . . . .”).
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Nelson argues, the Supremacy Clause is best interpreted as an exam-
ple of an eighteenth century non obstante provision: “[The Supremacy
Clause] requires courts to iguore [sic] state law if (but only if) state
law contradicts a valid rule established by federal law, so that applying
the state law would entail disregarding the valid federal rule.”196  Fed-
eral statutes that preempt state law effectively become part of state
law.197  This interpretation allows the different aspects of the
Supremacy Clause to be read together; for example, the provisions
about state courts and about the supremacy of federal law.  A state
court (or a federal court sitting in diversity and applying state law)
adjudicating a tort claim in which there is a colorable argument for
federal preemption should, then, read the federal provision of law as
if it were a (supreme) part of state law.198
But if a federal statute or regulation is to be read as part of a
state’s law—for our purposes, state tort law—what role should it play
in deciding the case?  My argument is that the most plausible render-
ing of the role of potentially preemptive federal law in a state tort
claim is that the federal law provides a defense to the defendant that is
the inverse of negligence per se.  By bringing the federal law—a stat-
ute or regulation setting a safety standard—within the ambit of state
law, we make the best sense of what the effect of federal preemption is
196 Nelson, supra note 25, at 234.
197 Id. at 246 (“The first aspect of the Supremacy Clause may strike modern read-
ers as highfalutin rhetoric.  But it serves a straightforward function:  It sets out what
might be called a ‘rule of applicability,’ making clear that federal law applies even in
state courts.  At least as far as the courts are concerned, then, federal statutes take
effect automatically within each state and form part of the same body of jurispru-
dence as state statutes.”).
198 See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Comman-
deer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1022–23 (1995)
(“The relationship between the lawmaking powers of these dual agents [of the federal
and state governments] is specified by the Supremacy Clause, which declares that the
federal ‘Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .’  The Clause’s injunc-
tion that the various forms of federal law (Constitution, statute, treaty, regulatory, and
judge-made) constitute the ‘supreme law of the land’ establishes the following picture
of dual governance.  Within the territory of each state there reigns what I call a corpus
of ‘in-state law,’ which itself combines two sets of law from different sources.  These
are: (a) state law as conventionally understood, meaning the state constitution, stat-
utes, and other forms of positive law; and (b) federal law as conventionally under-
stood, that is by its terms applicable in the state.  Because federal law in category (b)
supersedes state law in category (a) when they conflict, federal law may also be
thought of as ‘supreme in-state law.’  The important conceptual point is that in-state
law is comprised of both state and federal law, with the latter dominating the
former.”).
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within the law of torts, make available to courts a body of well-devel-
oped tort doctrine, and avoid the confused meanderings that cur-
rently mark preemption cases.
When the federal government acts to preempt state tort law, it
operates just as a legislative or administrative determination with
respect to the standard of care in the doctrine of negligence per se.
The justifications for negligence per se—preference for democrati-
cally accountable legislative determination over case-by-case jury adju-
dication and party reliance on such standards—were classically
expressed in such early cases as Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Martin v.
Herzog199 and map onto successful claims for preemption.  So also
cases in which courts refuse to find negligence per se applicable—
notably, where the class of protected persons and the type of injury
suffered are not within the scope of the statute or regulation—help us
understand when courts have not found preemption.200
The advantage of this account is that it avoids the confusing,
erratic, and under-determinative matrix of express and implied pre-
emption analysis.  While normally lumped into questions of adminis-
trative law, products liability preemption cases arise as tort claims, in
which an allegedly injured plaintiff seeks a remedy against the defen-
dant who (in the Third Restatement’s formulation for design and infor-
199 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (“We think the unexcused omission of the statu-
tory signals is more than some evidence of negligence.  It is negligence in itself. . . . By
the very terms of the hypothesis, to omit, willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards pre-
scribed by law for the benefit of another that he may be preserved in life or limb, is to
fall short of the standard of diligence to which those who live in organized society are
under a duty to conform.”).
200 From within a modified law and economics framework, Kyle Logue has also
recently advanced an argument for undertaking such case-by-case tort-related consid-
erations in preemption cases. See Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2346 (2010) (“Courts (at least appellate courts, who are given
the ultimate task of interpreting and implementing the boundaries between common
law tort claims and non-tort regulatory regimes) should consider the nature of the
non-tort regulation at issue and whether the goal of efficient deterrence (i.e., creating
optimal ex ante accident-avoidance incentives at the lowest administrative cost) would
best be achieved if that regulation is understood as an efficient floor or as both an
efficient floor and an efficient ceiling.  If the regulation in question is an efficient
floor only, then a conclusion of no displacement—or no preemption—would be opti-
mal; and negligence per se should be applied in cases of noncompliance.  If the regu-
lation is likely to involve an efficient floor-and-ceiling (a precisely efficient standard of
care) but additional state-level enforcement would be useful, then a symmetrical rule
of negligence and non-negligence per se would make sense—or one-way displace-
ment/preemption.  And, of course, if it happens to be a case in which federal regula-
tion seems to be fully optimizing, the court could reach the full displacement/
preemption conclusion, although, again, that would be an extreme result and should
not be reached lightly.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 34  8-MAR-13 16:13
1282 notre dame law review [vol. 88:3
mational defects) allegedly failed to reduce or avoid the foreseeable
risks of harm to a product’s user by adopting a reasonable alternative
design that rendered the product not reasonably safe.201  The defense
of preemption can, then, be viewed as the inverse of a plaintiff’s argu-
ment in garden-variety negligence cases that defendant’s breach can
be established on account of violation of a statutorily- or administra-
tively-established standard of care.
Of course, the traditional use of negligence per se by plaintiffs
against defendants in negligence cases is known to every first-year law
student.  The Restatement (Second)’s familiar factors provide that:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administra-
tive regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose inter-
est is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has
resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from
which the harm results.202
In Ezra Ripley Thayer’s classic formulation:
The true attitude of the courts, therefore, is to ascertain the legisla-
ture’s expressed intent, to refrain from conjecture as to its unex-
pressed intent (except in so far as that inquiry is necessary in order
to give effect to what is expressed), and then to consider the result-
ing situation in the light of the common law.203
And in Thayer’s formulation we see the warrant for case-by-case
inquiry in determining the effect of a statute or regulation that fre-
quently evades courts in preemption cases.204  Where a federal statute
displaces manufacturer choice, preemption applies—Congress or the
regulatory agency is setting the safety standard.  But where a statute or
regulation is not intended to cover the class of persons including the
plaintiff or (more importantly, because more often the deciding fac-
201 See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for
Defective Product Design, 74 BROOK. L. REV 1061 (2009) (analyzing case law regarding
proving the existence of a reasonable alternative design).
202 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965)
203 Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 320
(1914).
204 Though I disagree with many of the article’s conclusions, a helpful summary of
several cases of negligence per se can be found in Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble
with Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221 (2009).
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tor) to protect against the harm suffered by the plaintiff, then pre-
emption should not apply.  As summarized by Benjamin Zipursky, in
negligence per se:
The plaintiff cannot win unless the injury was a realization of a risk
that captures the relevant aspect of the statutory duty imposed upon
the defendant.  Just as courts doing negligence-per-se analysis must
scrutinize the statutory duty-imposing norm to establish the fit with
the injury in the case before it, so courts doing scope-of-the-risk
analysis in common-law negligence claims must scrutinize the com-
mon-law duty-imposing norm to ascertain whether the injury was
properly correlated with the imposition of the duty.205
Viewing preemption as inverse negligence per se helps to explain
two highly peculiar features of preemption doctrine.  First, the
unevenness and unpredictability of preemption decisions is explained
as a failure to attend to more than just slight differences in statutory
text or as the federal regulatory objective not being significant.  By
emphasizing the variation among statutory and regulatory frameworks
with regard to protected persons and interests, inverse negligence per
se analysis might help to explain the otherwise seemingly random out-
comes of preemption cases and to justify judicial scrutiny of the stan-
dard of care set by the statute or regulation.  Second, the seemingly
drastic choice confronting a court in a preemption case—either allow
the common law claim to go forward to resolution or deprive the
plaintiff of recovery on preemption grounds—is allayed by the judicial
discretion to determine in the first instance whether a statute sets a
standard of care, which statutory standard to adopt, and whether “a
statutory duty is always a valid substitute for common law duty.”206
Of course, there is an asymmetry between negligence per se and
inverse negligence per se. A court finding negligence per se never
addresses the question of whether a legislature or agency intended to
displace the plaintiff’s right to bring a claim—indeed, the right to
bring the claim is assumed, and negligence per se merely establishes
the relevant standard of care. Inverse negligence per se, by contrast,
operates to foreclose the plaintiff’s claim and to displace the tort
remedy.207
Applied to the cases summarized above, we can begin to see how
an inverse negligence per se analysis would work.  In the pair of medi-
205 Benjamin C. Zipurksy, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1271 (2009).
206 Paul Yowell, Judicial Discretion in Adopting Legislative Standards: Texas’s Solution to
the Problem of Negligence Per Se?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 109, 126 (1997).
207 I am grateful to John Goldberg for this observation about the asymmetry
between negligence per se and inverse negligence per se.
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cal device cases, the difference between the anti-preemption holding
of Lohr and the pro-preemption holding of Riegel is more than just an
exercise in statutory interpretation, which is too often an under-deter-
minative guide to resolving cases arising under express preemption.
It was Congress’s intent in enacting the Medical Device Amendments
that design defect or failure to warn claims brought by plaintiffs alleg-
edly injured by medical devices that had gone through the full pre-
market FDA approval process were foreclosed by the establishment of
a federal standard of care with respect to such plaintiffs for such
harms.  By contrast, in Lohr the MDA’s silence on preemption for
claims for products that have been brought to market by showing simi-
larity to an already-approved device did not set a federal standard of
care and leaves intact common law remedies, again with respect to
such plaintiffs for such harms.208
In Williamson and Geier, some of the puzzling features of Justice
Breyer’s discussion of whether manufacturer choice is a substantial
federal objective can be reframed as whether claims by classes of pro-
spective plaintiffs who have been injured as a result of particular prod-
ucts are included within the ambit of the federal regulatory standard
of care.  Some such plaintiffs and injuries caused by some products
(such as automobiles designed with lap-only seat belts) will, upon
inspection, fall outside the federally established standard of care.  But
in other cases, design defect claims against automobile manufacturers
will fail—as in Geier—because the agency contemplated that there
would be a class of potential plaintiffs who would suffer injury on
account of the lack of an airbag in an automobile and yet intended
that manufacturers not face liability for failing to install airbags.209  In
such a case, the agency set the standard of care so as to leave the
manufacturer free to adopt the standard as a floor (and to install
airbags) or as a ceiling (by not installing airbags) without the prospect
of tort liability forcing second-guessing of the decision.210
Finally, in both Wyeth and Mensing, much of the preemption anal-
ysis turned on whether the pharmaceutical manufacturer could have
altered the label by strengthening the warning or was foreclosed from
doing so without FDA approval.211  While, once again, the Supreme
Court’s different holdings on the preemption question in Levine and
Mensing seem to turn on statutory interpretation (in Justice Stevens’s
208 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495–97 (1996).
209 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
210 Id. at 868.
211 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2578 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 570–72 (2009).
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and Justice Thomas’s majority opinions respectively) or in disagree-
ments about the scope of implied preemption (in Justice Alito’s dis-
sent in Levine or Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Mensing), less attention
was paid to the class of patients, types of drugs, and potential harms
(and countervailing benefits) in the prescription drug labeling cases.
Viewed through the guise of inverse negligence per se, it was impor-
tant in Levine that the FDA never had the opportunity to consider
whether the risk to a patient buying a particular brand-name drug
should be covered by a stronger warning on the label, and so the FDA
never established a standard of care for defendant manufacturers in
such cases.212  In Mensing, the class of patients protected by the fed-
eral regulatory regime (buyers of generic as opposed to brand-name
drugs) was different, and the agency rebutted the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments that there were steps available to the defendant to strengthen
the warning on the label (to conform to a higher standard of care).213
In such a case, the federal safety regime sets a ceiling on the standard
of care such that conformity with that standard is, to adapt Judge Car-
dozo’s formulation, non-negligence in itself.
B. Inverse Negligence Per Se and Regulatory Compliance
My account of inverse negligence per se differs in important
respects, if only slightly at some points, from the more familiar regula-
tory compliance defense.  Debates about preemption of state tort
claims and the regulatory compliance defense are both debates in
which courts struggle with the relationship between standards set by
regulatory agencies and standards set by imposition of tort liability.
Preemption—a doctrine based in the Supremacy Clause—is a ques-
tion of constitutional law and federalism that requires courts to con-
sider whether federal law expressly or impliedly displaces state law.
The regulatory compliance defense provides that a defendant’s com-
pliance with a safety regulation establishes due care as a matter of
law.214  As noted above, only a few states permit the regulatory compli-
212 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570–72.
213 PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575.
214 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Phar-
maceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1018–19 (2007)
(“[T]he recurrent debate—in the academy and the courts—regarding the interplay
between federal regulations and state common law tort actions has, in less than a
decade, radically shifted from regulatory compliance to federal preemption.  If state
courts have an institutional interest in preserving the autonomy of state common law
from broad federal overrides, then presumably one should expect the same resistance
to claims of outright preemption.  Perhaps most striking, then, is not the fact that
federal courts’ enthusiasm for preemption outpaces state courts, but the fact that pre-
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ance defense to serve as a complete defense to liability, and the
Restatements have been hostile (Second) or cautious (Third) to regula-
tory compliance defense.  As the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides,
“[c]ompliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regu-
lation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable
man would take additional precautions.”215  The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability states that:
[A] product’s compliance with an applicable product safety statute
or administrative regulation is properly considered in determining
whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to
be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance does
not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.216
As to the relation between regulatory compliance and preemp-
tion, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability offers the follow-
ing clarification about the difference between regulatory compliance
and preemption:
[Regulatory compliance] addresses the question of whether and to
what extent, as a matter of state tort law, compliance with product
safety statutes or administrative regulations affects liability for prod-
uct defectiveness.  When a court concludes that a defendant is not
liable by reason of having complied with a safety design or warnings
statute or regulation, it is deciding that the product in question is
not defective as a matter of the law of that state.  The safety statute
or regulation may be a federal provision, but the decision to give it
determinative effect is a state-law determination.  In contrast, in fed-
eral preemption, the court decides as a matter of federal law that
the relevant federal statute or regulation reflects, expressly or
impliedly, the intent of Congress to displace state law, including
state tort law, with the federal statute or regulation.  The question of
preemption is thus a question of federal law, and a determination
that there is preemption nullifies otherwise operational state law.
The complex set of rules and standards for resolving questions of
federal preemption are beyond the scope of this Restatement.  How-
ever, when federal preemption is found, the legal effect is clear.217
emption has gained any traction whatsoever in state courts, which by and large have
previously rejected any absolute regulatory compliance defense.”); see also Robert L.
Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2004) (explaining the dif-
ferences between regulatory compliance and regulatory preemption); Alan Schwartz,
Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the proper role of regulatory compliance in light
of regulatory preemption).
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
216 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 4(b) (1998).
217 Id. § 4 cmt. e.
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The result of a court finding preemption and a jury granting dis-
positive weight to a defendant’s regulatory compliance is the same—
the plaintiff cannot recover.  In fact, the fundamental question under-
lying each doctrine is the same: When should courts defer to regula-
tory agencies to set standards of care as a matter of law and when
should courts adopt common law standards to determine liability?
But presented with the same underlying question, courts answering it
through the doctrine of preemption and through the doctrine of reg-
ulatory compliance resolve the question differently.  Preemption
cases—as demonstrated in the discussion above—come to different
results even when courts are applying the same or similar statutory
and regulatory frameworks.218  The regulatory compliance defense,
however, is a blanket grant of statutory immunity, a sweeping doctrine
that, partly on account of its potential breadth, has rarely been recog-
nized by courts, enacted by legislatures, or endorsed by the
Restatements.219
This is because federal preemption, as usually understood, is
about the vertical relationship between the federal and state govern-
ments, while the regulatory compliance defense is about the horizontal
relationship among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.
Part of the problem in the preemption debate is that courts are forced
to conduct a “vertical” federalism analysis when a “horizontal” doc-
trine such as regulatory compliance might better resolve the issues
posed by the case, particularly where consideration of regulatory com-
pliance might better govern the relationship between state tort law
and regulatory agencies than the murky doctrine of implied preemp-
tion.  But the regulatory compliance defense in its usual formulation
is too blunt an instrument, as signaled by the Third Restatement’s reluc-
tance to endorse it.  A better approach that has the benefits of a “hori-
zontal” comparative competence approach without sacrificing case-by-
case judicial examination of the underlying interests protected by the
statutory or regulatory regime is provided by inverse negligence per se
analysis.
218 Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (holding the plaintiff’s
claims were not preempted); Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996) (same)
with  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008) (holding the plaintiff’s
claim were preempted); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000)
(same).
219 Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1210, 1239 (1996) (“Unfortunately, in its present form, the regulatory compli-
ance defense is too weak to provide much of a safe harbor to product sellers.”).
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CONCLUSION
The most convinced proponents and opponents of federal pre-
emption will reject my argument here.  Those who, for example,
understand state tort claims as a benign complement to regulatory
safety standards will resist the use of safety standards as a floor and
ceiling.  Such views regard safety regulations as merely a floor, above
which defendants should go in order to assure optimal safety and
avoid liability.  But the Supreme Court has held more or less consist-
ently that federal safety regulations can, in at least some cases, estab-
lish a ceiling above which defendants do not need to (and, as in
Mensing, cannot) take additional precautions—indeed, that is what a
case upholding federal preemption entails.  In cases of inverse negli-
gence per se, the statute or regulation establishes a floor of reasonable
care below which a defendant’s conduct may not fall but also a ceiling
above which the manufacturer need not take additional precautions,
while in cases rejecting the preemption defense the court is recogniz-
ing that the federal floor can and should be exceeded.220
One implication of my argument is that proposals advocating
clear statement rules for preemption demand too much of legislatures
and agencies, for such clear statement rules have not traditionally
been required in negligence per se doctrine.221  Just as we have ser-
viceable canons of statutory interpretation in negligence per se cases,
so we can apply these interpretive methods “in reverse” to preemp-
tion.  Preemption as inverse negligence per se is, however, consistent
with and complementary to other proposals in the preemption litera-
ture.  Catherine Sharkey’s agency-reference model, for example,
argues that courts have (descriptively) and should (normatively) look
to the agency’s relevant expertise, the care with which a preemption
determination was made, and the overall regulatory framework.222  My
argument here is that many of Sharkey’s objectives are met by the
traditional categories of negligence per se analysis, including an
examination of whether the purportedly preemptive regulation was
intended to cover a class of persons including the plaintiff and the risk
that caused the plaintiff’s injury, though I sidestep some of the incon-
clusive debates in administrative law about agency deference.
220 See William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism’s Insti-
tutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 98 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
221 See generally Hills, supra note 98 (arguing that an anti-preemption rule of statu-
tory construction would benefit the federal law-making process by promoting visible,
vigorous debate in Congress).
222 Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58
DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009); Sharkey, supra note 6.
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More broadly, preemption as inverse negligence per se has impli-
cations for topics in tort theory, including the interplay between stat-
utes and the common law and the private law aspects of tort law.
Different areas of preemption would, of course, require different anal-
ysis, just as different types of tort and products liability claims—failure
to warn, design defect, and manufacturing defect claims—would
require analysis specific to those claims.  Much of the revival of inter-
est in private law aspects of tort law has focused on the elements of
negligence and showing how features of negligence—the causation
requirement, for example—are difficult to account for in a function-
alist perspective.  But those who would buck the tide of functionalism
should engage the breadth of tort law, and few features of contempo-
rary tort law are as controversial as federal preemption.  If my argu-
ment is correct, then at least some of that controversy is on account of
a misunderstanding about central aspects of federal preemption,
namely the failure to attend to the specific tort aspects of federal pre-
emption of state tort claims and a rush to embrace constitutional and
administrative law approaches to preemption at the expense of more
precise, historically sound, and well-developed common law doctrines
such as negligence per se.
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